A brief pause in a steep decline

President Lee Jae-myung’s falling approval rating appeared to level off in late September, but the figures remained troubling. A Korea Society Opinion Institute survey released on September 30 found that 38.5% approved of Lee’s performance and 57.8% disapproved. Two weeks earlier, approval stood at 35.9% and disapproval at 59.4%.

A separate National Indicator Survey released on October 1 put approval at 43%, with disapproval at 50%. Three weeks before that, the same survey had recorded 43% approval and 48% disapproval. The numbers vary by survey, but together they show a president whose support had weakened substantially since taking office.

A pause in a decline is not the same as a recovery. The political question is whether Lee can persuade voters who have stopped supporting him to reconsider.

The commentary behind the figures offers two possible explanations for the short-term stabilization. First, public anger may have eased after Lee bowed his head during a news conference before the Chuseok holiday, a major Korean family holiday, and apologized. The justice minister nominee resigned the following day. Second, approval may have reached a floor: even after many voters turn against a president, a committed group of supporters often remains.

The numbers point to a centrist problem

A comparison of monthly Gallup Korea averages shows the scale of the change. In May, shortly before the June 3 election, 63% approved of Lee and 28% disapproved. By September, the figures had shifted to 38% approval and 53% disapproval. In just four months, positive and negative assessments had effectively reversed.

The downturn crossed regional, age, and political lines. But the movement among centrists was particularly significant. In May, 64% of self-described centrist voters approved of Lee and 26% disapproved. By September, 37% approved and 53% disapproved. Among self-described progressives, approval also fell, from 91% to 62%, while disapproval rose from 7% to 33%.

A separate analysis of 545 registered presidential approval polls, covering the early months of Lee’s term through September 22, also found a pronounced loss among both groups. It estimated that support among progressive voters fell from 79.2% to 53.4%, while support among centrists dropped from 65.9% to 39.5%.

  • Core supporters are voters who are strongly attached to a party or political leader and are less likely to switch sides.
  • Centrists are voters who do not consistently identify with either the left or the right and may judge each government issue by issue.
  • Because centrists often make up a large share of the persuadable electorate, losing their confidence can weigh heavily on an overall approval rating.

These figures do not, by themselves, explain why individuals changed their views. But they challenge the idea that the decline is mainly a problem of traditional supporters abandoning Lee. The numbers suggest that the president’s difficulty extends beyond his core base—and that a recovery strategy focused only on that base may be insufficient.

The political choice: consolidate the base or broaden it?

In politics, the familiar “home voters versus swing voters” debate has no universal answer. A leader who ignores loyal supporters can lose the party’s energy and organization. But a leader who speaks mainly to those supporters may struggle to gain the broader public’s consent, especially in a nationwide election.

The argument presented here is that Lee and his Democratic Party should now prioritize restoring centrist confidence. Lee campaigned on two broad promises: addressing the aftermath of the political crisis described as an attempted insurrection, and governing through pragmatic policies that could attract support beyond his political base. With the first agenda presented as nearing completion, the challenge is to make the second promise credible.

That would not necessarily mean abandoning the party’s principles. It would mean explaining how those principles can be put into practice, considering public concerns and adjusting methods when evidence or circumstances call for it. For example, a government can remain committed to reform while changing the timing, scope, or safeguards of a bill to make it workable and easier for the public to accept.

The central strategic claim is that moving toward practical, broadly acceptable policies need not drive core supporters away. But concentrating too heavily on the base could make it harder for centrists to return.

Why approval ratings affect a president’s ability to govern

A president’s approval rating is not just a measure of popularity. It can influence whether lawmakers cooperate, whether the public accepts difficult trade-offs, and whether major plans can move from announcement to implementation. When confidence is low, even a reasonable proposal can be treated with suspicion; when confidence is stronger, voters may be more willing to give a government time to explain its choices.

This creates a difficult cycle. A government may lose support because people believe it is not delivering. At the same time, low support can make it harder to deliver, because opponents have less reason to compromise and the public is less willing to accept short-term costs. The article warns that this could weaken the momentum behind Lee’s three major national projects, though it does not specify their details.

The consequences could reach beyond day-to-day policy. The analysis points to a possible Seoul mayoral by-election in 2027, the National Assembly election in 2028, and the presidential election in 2030. If the governing party performs poorly in those contests, reforms undertaken during Lee’s term—including proposed prosecution and judicial reforms—could be reversed, stalled, or substantially changed by a future government.

  • High approval can provide political room to propose reforms and ask the public to accept short-term disruption.
  • Low approval can reduce that room, making opposition stronger and compromise more difficult.
  • Electoral losses can put policies at risk, since a successor government may change course.

These are risks, not guaranteed outcomes. Still, the argument is that political support is part of the machinery of governing: it helps determine whether a president can turn an agenda into lasting policy.

Kim Young-sam: reform can move quickly when the public is behind it

Former President Kim Young-sam’s early years in office are offered as an example of how strong public backing can help a leader act decisively. In 1993, his government disclosed the assets of public officials, dismantled the Hanahoe military faction, and introduced real-name financial transactions, requiring people to use their actual identities in financial dealings.

Kim later recalled that public support gave his government the confidence to accelerate reform. He argued that successful change required both strong leadership and public consent, including a willingness among citizens to share the costs of change. In everyday terms, a government may be able to carry out a difficult reform more effectively when people believe the goal is fair and trust the leader explaining why it is necessary.

But the same presidency also illustrates the danger of pushing through a major measure without sufficient political support. In December 1996, the government passed a labor-law revision in a rushed National Assembly vote involving members brought in from the opposition and independents. The incident became known as the labor-law controversy.

Kim later wrote that the timing—late in his presidency—had weighed on his thinking. He said he believed delaying the changes could harm national competitiveness, but the controversial procedure triggered a political crisis and contributed to the collapse of his government’s standing. The lesson is not simply that reform should be fast or slow. It is that timing, public consent, and the legitimacy of the process can determine whether a policy survives its passage.

Roh Moo-hyun: even reasonable proposals need public trust

Former President Roh Moo-hyun’s experience offers a related lesson. Yoon Tae-young, a former speech-planning secretary who wrote an authorized biography of Roh, reflected that Roh cared deeply about national unity and often tried to prepare for challenges well in advance. But, Yoon said, the president may at times have looked too far ahead and failed to persuade people who needed to be brought along step by step.

Yoon also described how public reaction changed with approval ratings. When Roh’s support was high, people were more open to his proposals. When it was low, even reasonable ideas could be rejected or misunderstood. That observation points to a practical limit on a president’s ability to govern: an argument’s quality matters, but public trust affects whether people are willing to hear it.

The distinction resembles the idea of looking half a step ahead rather than several steps ahead. A leader can have a long-term vision, but may need to connect it to problems people recognize today—such as household expenses, jobs, public services, or confidence in institutions. Without that bridge, ambitious plans can feel remote, even when their supporters believe they are necessary.

Lee Hae-chan’s advice: learn values from history, methods from reality

The late Lee Hae-chan, a former Democratic Party leader whom Lee Jae-myung admired, expressed a similar balance between principle and pragmatism. He described himself as a gradual reformer rather than a believer in extreme or uncompromising positions. His guiding idea was: “Learn values from history, and methods from reality.”

The distinction is important. Values describe the destination—such as fairness, democracy, or a more equal society. Methods are the practical routes for getting there, and they can change when a plan proves ineffective or loses public support. In the example of a public service reform, the goal might remain the same while the rollout is staged, safeguards are added, or feedback is used to fix problems.

Lee Hae-chan argued that steady and thorough reformers can contribute more to social progress than people who swing between uncompromising positions. Applied to the current presidency, that approach would mean remaining clear about long-term commitments while being flexible about how to carry them out.

The test for Lee’s government

The analysis raises concerns about decisions in which Lee appeared to retreat after opposition from influential figures within his political camp. During debate over revisions to the Criminal Procedure Act, Lee had said prosecutors’ supplementary investigative powers should be allowed only in exceptional cases, but later abandoned that position after former party leader Jung Cheong-rae opposed it. The article also says the appointment process for Kim Ji-yong, a nominee to lead the Serious Crimes Investigation Agency, was delayed after objections from Gyeonggi Province Governor Choo Mi-ae and lawmaker Kim Yong-min.

The examples are presented as evidence that the president may be giving too much weight to core supporters and political allies. A different reading could emphasize the value of consultation and the need to resolve internal disagreements before acting. Either way, the larger challenge is to show that policy decisions are guided by a coherent public-interest case—not simply by whichever faction exerts the most pressure.

A practical strategy for rebuilding broader confidence could include:

  • Explain the goal and the trade-offs of major reforms in plain language, including who may bear short-term costs.
  • Listen beyond the party base, using public feedback and evidence to identify concerns that can be addressed.
  • Be consistent about principles but flexible about methods, adjusting implementation without losing sight of the intended outcome.
  • Demonstrate delivery, because credible results in people’s daily lives can matter more than political messaging alone.

The historical examples do not provide a guaranteed formula. Kim Young-sam shows how public support can create room for reform, but also how a politically damaging process can undermine it. Roh Moo-hyun’s experience highlights how low trust can make even sensible proposals difficult to advance. Lee Hae-chan’s advice offers a possible guide: hold on to the values, while choosing methods that fit present-day realities.

The broader argument is that Lee’s path to a durable recovery runs through voters outside his core base. Winning them back may require not less commitment to reform, but more persuasive, practical, and publicly trusted ways to carry it out.